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Economic Problems of Fraud Law
Robert A. Leflar*

F

are as old as human communication. Many of today's devices for deceit are that old too.
The outright lie, the misleading half-truth, the tricky act that
speaks without words were inventions of primitive man, reinvented as each new generation of the acquisitive and the gullible
came into competitive existence. Negligence in the use of words
likewise began when use of words began. Some of today's fraudulent transactions are similarly ancient in character, distinguishable only by environment from events at the dawn of history.
Perhaps that is true of all twentieth century fraud; it is ancient
guile in modern dress.
Whether fraud has changed or not, the economic society in
which it occurs has changed, and ethical standards which prevailed a millennium or even a generation ago will not maintain
the vaunted efficiency of today's complex commercial and industrial organization. A credit economy such as America's cannot operate on a Yankee horsetrader's ethics. Reliability rather than
guile must be the business standard. Confident reliance depends upon accuracy. Today, even careless inaccuracy defeats
the economy's requirements.
Traditionally, law lags behind socio-economic mores. That
is clearly true of the common law, and almost equally true of
legislation in a common law country. Specifically, it has been
true of the law's sanctions against commercial falsehood. Most
of these sanctions were formulated as common law in the latter
half of the nineteenth century, on a foundation built still earlier,
and reflected standards of a low-level marketplace which even
then were being superseded in the better marketplaces. Since
those days the gap has widened. In nearly all areas of commercial intercourse the need for reliability, largely regardless of
fault, will increase as the century progresses. It is generally
agreed that legislation rather than the common law's slow
processes must fill the gap. And the legislation should be drafted
by experts whose studies look well beyond our economic past.
RAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
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Is maximum efficiency in the economy the ultimate and whole
ideal for this legislative up-dating of the law? Surely not! Society's mores furnish the standard, and economic efficiency
is only one item, albeit an increasingly important one, in the
bundle of values which society takes into account when it draws
its line of minimum approval for free speech in the marketplace.
We tolerate more freedom of speech for sellers of geriatric
medications and used cars than for sellers of listed securities.
Why is that so? There are controversial economic areas, within
the confines of private enterprise, in which honest differences of
opinion and opposing analyses of fact render the constitutional
guaranty of free speech as vital as in areas of political or cultural controversy. The social values that inhere in uninhibited
expression of opinion and publication of controverted fact can
be as genuine when motivated by free economic enterprise as
when motivated by any other kind of enterprise. The anti-social
aspects of economic deception when balanced against these social
values will not always outweigh them.
The lawmaker's task of balancing between free expression on
the one hand and a modern economy's demand for accurate reporting on the other is no easy one, no easier than when society's
well-being calls for any other interference with freedom of
speech.'
1 Cf. Leflar, The Free-ness of Free Speech, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1073 (1962).
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